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Abstract— Software rejuvenation has been proposed as a
strategy to protect cyber-physical systems (CSPs) against unan-
ticipated and undetectable cyber attacks. The basic idea is
to refresh the system periodically with a secure and trusted
copy of the online software so as to eliminate all effects
of malicious modifications to the run-time code and data.
Following each software refresh a safety controller assures the
CPS is driven to a safe state before returning to the mission
control mode when the CPS is again vulnerable attacks. This
paper considers software rejuvenation design from a control-
theoretic perspective. Invariant sets for the Lyapunov function
for the safety controller are used to derive bounds on the time
that the CPS can operate in mission control mode before the
software must be refreshed and the maximum time the safety
controller will require to bring the CPS to a safe operating
state. With these results it can be guaranteed that the CPS will
remain safe under cyber attacks against the run-time system
and will be able to execute missions successfully if the attacks
are not persistent. The general approach is illustrated using
simulation of the nonlinear dynamics of a quadrotor system.
The concluding section discusses directions for further research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber security has become a significant research and
development issue for control of cyber-physical systems
(CPSs), particularly for safety critical applications [1], [2],
[3], [4]. The primary goal is to prevent physical damage to
the system or environment due to malicious cyber attacks.
Standard approaches to security rely on effective attack
models. But attacks can be perpetrated in many different
ways, and it is impossible to model all possible attacks.
Moreover, even the best detection mechanisms are impotent
if an attacker is able to modify the run-time software.
Software rejuvenation, an established method for dealing
with so-called software aging in traditional computing sys-
tems [5], has been proposed recently to deal with unmodeled
and undetectable cyber attacks on CPSs [6], [7]. The idea
is to periodically refresh the run-time system completely
with a trusted, secure copy of the control software to thwart
attacks that may have changed the on-line code. Although
the basic concept has been implemented for some demon-
stration systems, timing bounds for the software rejuvenation
schedule need to be obtained to assure that the software is
refreshed before any damage has been done from malicious
software and that the CPS will remain safe and viable after
restarting the control software. This paper derives these
bounds using invariant sets for the case of controlling a
CPS at an equilibrium state as a first step towards a sound
theory of guaranteed security for general CPS using software
rejuvenation.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
The concept of software rejuvenation was introduced by
Huang et al. in 1995 [5] to address the problem of so-
called software aging; that is, failures that occur when a
running program encounters a state that was not anticipated
when the software was designed. The basic idea is to
restart the software intermittently at a "clean" state, either
through complete system reboot or by returning to a recent
checkpoint, with the hope that this will prolong the time until
unanticipated states occur that might cause failures. Since
the introduction of the concept, there has been considerable
research into the development and performance of software
rejuvenation strategies [8], and it has become a practical tool
for enhancing the robustness of many computing systems [9].
Although software aging remains the primary motivation
for implementing software rejuvenation strategies in com-
puting systems, a few papers have proposed software reju-
venation to enhance system security [10], [11]. In contrast to
software aging where mean-time to failure can be the basis
for timing software refresh, the frequency of software refresh
to defend against malicious attacks must be determined by
the length of time a system can remain viable once its
security has been violated.
Arroyo et al. [6], [7] propose software rejuvenation as a
strategy for CPS security and demonstrated the concept for
a quadrotor controller and an automotive engine controller.
These examples illustrate how refreshing software in a CPS
impacts performance and introduces timing constraints and
safety considerations that aren’t present in traditional com-
puting systems.
Abidi et al. [12] develop software rejuvenation for CPS
further by introducing three concepts. First, the hardware
root of trust is a secure onboard module that hosts the
capabilities that must be available without compromise to
implement software rejuvenation. Second, the secure exe-
cution interval (SEI) is a period during which all external
communication is disabled so that no cyber attacks can occur
as the software is refreshed. Third, the safety controller,
which executes immediately following a software refresh
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and during the SEI, drives the CPS to a known safe state
before restoring communication and returning the system to
mission control with vulnerability to attacks. Abidi et al. use
a simple, conservative reachability algorithm to determine
the time that can be allowed before the next software reset
and illustrate their approach for a simulated warehouse
temperature controller and a bench-top 3-DOF helicopter.
In this paper, we adopt the overall approach to software
rejuvenation from [12], but modify the timing strategy based
on analysis of the control problem. We formulate the soft-
ware rejuvenation problem for CPS applications where the
safety controller is designed using the linearized dynamics
to take the system to a neighborhood of a given equilib-
rium state. Using invariant sets for the safety controller
and system operating constraints, we derive bounds on the
timing parameters for software rejuvenation strategy. We also
introduce the concept of adding control constraints enforced
by the hardware root of trust to increase the time allowed
for mission control and software reset. We demonstrate our
contributions using simulation of the nonlinear dynamics for
a 6-DOF quadrotor.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We use the following notation. For a vector x ∈ Rn and
a symmetric n × n matrix Q, ||x||2Q = xTQx. For a given
dynamic system, the set of states reachable at time t > 0
from an initial state x(0) = x0 under control policy CP is
denoted by R(x0, t;CP ), with the natural extension to a set
of initial states. When the control policy is clear from the
context, the reachable set will be denoted as R(x0, t;CP ).
For a matrix M with real eigenvalues, λmin(M) denotes the
minimum eigenvalue of M .
A. Software rejuvenation algorithm
Figure 1 illustrates the three operating modes for a CPS
with software rejuvenation: mission control (MC), where the
CPS is executing its intended mission with network com-
munication to other agents in the overall system, including
possibly a supervisor; software refresh (SR), when a secure
copy of the operating software is reloaded to eliminate any
possible corruption of the run-time code and data; and safety
control (SC), which is described below. The period for each
of these operating modes is denoted TMC , TSR and TSC ,
respectively.
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Fig. 1. Software rejuvenation control modes.
Mission control is terminated by the timeout of the refresh
clock. To assure software refresh and safety control executed
without interference from potential attackers, external com-
munication is shutoff and the CPS operates autonomously
during the SEI (TSR + TSC). After execution of the safety
control, the refresh clock is restarted with the refresh clock
period tr (which determines TMC , communication is re-
established and th CPS returns to mission control. Attacks
can occur when there is communication. If there is an attack,
the control actions may not be known to the CPS controller.
This uncertainty about the control actions (and the state of
the CPS) remains through the software refresh.
The pseudo code in Alg. 1 illustrates the implementation
of the overall software rejuvenation strategy. The protected
secure hardware hosts: system communication; trusted soft-
ware image; refresh clock; and control limits that can be
imposed during MC and software SR to constrain what an
adversary could do during this period of uncertain control.
Since the system is operating securely during SC, these limits
can be removed for SC so that it can use the full control
capability.
Algorithm 1 Software Rejuvenation Algorithm
1: Initialize:
2: COMMUNICATION OFF; (protected)
3: LOAD SOFTWARE; (protected)
4: Step 1:
5: OFF → CTRL_LIMS; (protected)
6: WHILE x 6∈ E
7: SAFETY_CONTROL;
8: END
9: ON → CTRL_LIMS; (protected)
10: tr → REFRESH_CLK; (protected)
11: COMMUNICATION ON; (protected)
12: Step 2:
13: UNTIL timeout ← REFRESH_CLK (protected)
14: MISSION_CONTROL;
15: END
16: Step 3:
17: COMMUNICATION OFF; (protected)
18: REFRESH SOFTWARE; (protected)
19: GO TO Step 1;
B. Guaranteeing safety
To guarantee unknown control actions do not drive the
CPS into unsafe or undesired operating states, certain guar-
antees need to be enforced about the possible states reached
during the period of uncertain control (UC), TUC = TMC +
TSR. This is the period when an attacker may have taken
over control of the system. The conditions that need to be
satisfied are represented by two sets of states, the safe set and
the inner safe set, denoted EC and E, respectively. Figure
2 illustrates the role of these set. The safe set represents
general operating constraints to assure system safety and
controllability. The goal of the safety controller is to assure
the system remains in EC by always returning the state to
the inner-safe set before handing control back to the mission
controller. During the period TUC , the state may leave E,
but safety control must be executed before the state leaves
EC .
EC x(t)
E
Fig. 2. State constraints for software rejuvenation. Red: uncertain control;
green: safety control.
General conditions that guarantee the software rejuvena-
tion algorithm will keep the system in EC are summarized
by the following proposition [13].
Proposition 3.1: Given a CPS with time-invariant dynam-
ics and a set of safe states EC , a set of inner safe states
E ⊂ EC , software refresh time TSR and a safety controller
SC, if
i. x(0) ∈ EC ;
ii. ∃ TSC > 0 3 ∀ x ∈ EC , R(x, TSC ;SC) ⊆ E; and
iii. ∃ TUC > TSR 3 ∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ TUC , R(E, t;UC) ⊆ EC ;
then for the CPS controlled by the software rejuvenation
algorithm with tr = TUC − TSR, x(t) ∈ EC ∀ t ≥ 0.
Proposition 3.1 provides conditions for designing safe
software rejuvenation strategies. Condition (i) requires that
the system starts at a safe state. Condition (ii) indicates the
safety controller must be able to drive the system from all
safe states to the inner safe set in bounded time. The amount
of time SC executes depends on how long it takes to drive the
state to E (Alg. 1 line 6). Condition (iii) indicates that TUC
must be sufficient for software refresh and small enough that
no admissible control can take the system state from the inner
safe set to an unsafe state before safety control is initiated.
The software refresh time TSR is determined by the system
hardware and the size of the software image. EC should be
made as large as possible to maximize the time allowed
for mission control. For a given SC, design of the software
rejuvenation algorithm depends on the size of E and the
control constraints imposed during TMC and TSR. TUC can
be increased by reducing the size of E and by making the
control limits more conservative (Alg. 1 line 9). But a smaller
E can lead to longer times for SC and tighter control limits
reduce the control available for MC, so there are clear design
trade offs to be considered.
The remainder of the paper focuses on methods for satis-
fying the conditions in Prop. 3.1 for the case of controlling a
CPS in the neighborhood of an equilibrium point. We assume
a supervisor and mission controller always keep the CPS in
the neighborhood of some equilibrium point, which may be
changing as a mission is executed. What’s important is that
the current equilibrium xe is known and the state of the
system is always with EC of the equilibrium state. Section
IV shows how to find a maximal ellipsoidal safe set EC for
set of operating constraints defined by affine constraints in
the state space EC , and how to define a corresponding class
of inner safe states E such that for any stabilizing safety
controller TSC can be found to satisfy condition (ii). Section
V shows how to use reachabilty computations to find a TUC
that satisfies condition (iii).
IV. SAFETY CONTROLLER
The dynamics for the CPS linearized at the equilibrium
state xe are given by the LTI state equations
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) t ∈ R+, (1)
where x ∈ Rn and u ∈ Rm. Assuming the state is measur-
able and the system is controllable, the safety controller is
designed as a state feedback control law of the form
u(t) = −Kx(t) (2)
where K is a gain matrix chosen to make the closed-loop
system matrix ASC , (A−BK) Hurwitz. Thus, under safety
control the system dynamics are stable and given by
x˙(t) = ASCx(t). (3)
We assume the safe states can be represented by a convex
polyhedral region C ⊂ Rn of the state space given by
C = {x | ξTj x ≤ 1, j = 1, ..., nc} (4)
where nc represents the number of constraints representing
the operating constraints and the region about the equilibrium
where (1) and (3) hold with the control (2) adhering to the
control limits u ∈ U .
Let us define the safe set EC as the largest positively invari-
ant ellipsoid for (3) contained in C. This largest positively
invariant ellipsoid EC can be found solving the following
maximization problem [14]:
max log detQ
s.t. QATSC +ASCQ ≤ 0
ξTj Qξj ≤ 1, j = 1, ..., nc
Q > 0
(5)
Given a solution Q to (5), define P = Q−1. Assuming no
control saturation, V (x) = ||x||2P is a Lyapunov function for
(3) with
V˙ (x) = ATSCP + PASC < 0. (6)
The positively safe invariant set is given by
EC =
{
x | ||x||2P ≤ 1
}
. (7)
Note that EC is also defined by the set of states satisfying
V (x) ≤ 1.
Given 0 <  < 1, we define the invariant ellipsoid
E ,
{
x | V (x) = ||x||2P ≤ 
}
= EC . (8)
We want to show that there exists a TSC for which condition
(ii) of Prop. 3.1 is satisfied.
For any state trajectory x(t) of (3) starting at a given initial
condition x(0) = x0, it can be shown that [15]
V (x(t)) ≤ e−γ(t)V (x(0)), ∀ t ≥ 0, (9)
with
γ = min
x
− ˙V (x)
V (x)
= λmin(WP
−1), (10)
where W , −ATSCP − PASC . Therefore, (9) implies a
bound on the maximum time it can take for the safety
controller to drive the state of (3) to x(t) ∈ E (for which
V (x(t)) ≤ ) from any initial state x0 ∈ EC (for which
V (x0) ≤ 1) is given by
TSC =
−ln()
γ
. (11)
We note that in general (11) is a very conservative bound on
the worst-case value of TSC .
V. UNCERTAIN CONTROL PERIOD
This section presents a procedure to find a value of the
uncertain control period TUC that satisfies condition (iii) of
Prop. 3.1. Two conditions must be satisfied:
TUC > TSR (12)
and
∀ 0 ≤ t ≤ TUC , R(E, t;UC) ⊆ EC , (13)
where for (1)
R(E, t;UC) = {x|eAtx0 +
∫ t
0
eA(t−τ)Bu(τ)dτ,
x0 ∈ E, u(τ) ∈ U , 0 ≤ τ ≤ t}.
We first consider condition (13). Following the procedure
from [16], the maximum principle can be applied to over-
approximate the reach set at each point in time with a set
of supporting hyperplanes. We apply this procedure using
a polyhedral representation of U and a polytope P that
contains E as the approximation of R(E, 0;UC) and con-
tinue computing R(P, t;UC) which contains R(E, t;UC)
for increasing values of t until the overapproximation is
not contained in EC . The largest value of t for which
R(P, t;UC) ⊂ EC provides a value for TUC .
Entering into the details of the method of the computation
of the reach set described in [16], let us start from the
polytopic approximation of E
P = {x | αTi x ≤ 1, i = 1, ..., nc} ⊃ E, (14)
where nc represents the number of constraints. The support-
ing hyperplanes of the reach set R(P, t;UC) are
v+i (x, t) = αi(t)x (15)
where αi(t) are the normal directions computed as
αi(t) = e
−AT ταi. (16)
Expression (16) is obtained applying the Pontryagin maxi-
mum principle of optimal control theory [17]. Then, defining{
u1, u2, ..., unv
}
the nv vertexes that describise U , an over
approximation of the reachable set R(P, t;UC) is
R+(P, t;UC) = ⋂nci=1 {x|v+i (x, t) ≤∫ t
0
maxj 〈αi(τ), Buj〉dτ+
maxx(0)∈P v
+
i (x(0), 0)
}
.(17)
Those bounds are generated considering the supporting hy-
perplanes vi(x, t) as a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs
partial differential equation [18].
Since R+(P, t;UC) can be also represented in terms of
nr vertexes defined as x1, x2, ..., xnr ,
R+(P, t;UC) ⊆ EC ⇐⇒ xiTPxi ≤ 1, (18)
for i = 1, ..., nr. The largest value of t such that
R+(P, t;UC) ⊂ EC , is the largest value that satisfies (18).
If the computed value of TUC ≤ TSR, condition (12)
has not been satisfied and two strategies can be used to try
to increase the value TUC : (a)  can be reduced; and (b)
the constraints on the control can be reduced. Strategy (a)
increases the distance between the boundary of E and the
boundary of EC , meaning that it will take longer to drive the
system out of the safe set. This results in a smaller inner safe
set, however, which will increase the bound on the worst-
case execution time for the safety controller. Strategy (b) will
decrease the rate at which an attacker can drive the system
out of set of safe states. But the same control limits will
apply for the mission controller, so increased security will
be achieved at the expense of reducing system performance.
We illustrate these strategies to find a feasible value for TUC
in the following section.
VI. EXAMPLE
The proposed method is tested on a quadrotor system,
which represents a challenge for secure control scheme based
on software rejuvenation [7] [12]. The considered quadrotor
is the "Generic 10" Quad + geometry" used in the PX4
flight controller platform with full thrust of 4 N, and full
torque of 0.05 Nm for each motor [19]. The quadrotor is
described by a nonlinear mathematical model with 12 state
variables, 3 for the position in the inertial frame of reference,
3 for the orientation of the airframe (roll, pitch, yaw), 3
for the positional velocities, and 3 for the angular velocities
[20]. The control variables are the force normal to the air
frame and the torques about the three angles of orientation.
A matrix multiplication (the "mixer") maps these control
variables to the motor torques.
In general, the controller is designed considering a lin-
earized model of the system around an equilibrium point
[21] [22] [23]. Without loss of generality that equilibrium
point can be considered equal to origin of the state space. It
is important to note that the controller performance depends
on how close the system is operating to the equilibrium point.
Moving the system away from that equilibrium point the
controller could not work in a proper way. In this scenario,
it can be easy for an attacker to pursue physical damage to
the system.
The controller used to stabilize the linearized system is
an LQR controller with integral action [23]. The goal is to
keep the quadrotor hovering at the equilibrium point where
the system has been linearized.
For implementing the proposed software rejuvenation
scheme, the safe invariant ellipsoid EC is computed solving
the maximization problem (5) based on the set C that in
this case is represented by a set of constraints on each of
the 12 state variables. For the position, the vertical direction
is bounded between ± 5 m and the other two directions
between ± 2 m. The vertical velocity is bounded by ± 5 m/s,
and the horizontal velocity limits are ± 2 m/s. The bounds
on the angles of roll pitch and yaw are fundamental for
good performance of the linear controller. In this case all the
angles are bounded between ±pi/4. The angular velocities
are between ± 5 rad/s.
Following the procedure described in Section V, a feasible
value of TUC is 0.37 s for  = 0.01, with TSR = 0.1s. The
value of TUC has been computed considering the following
reduced bounds on the torques, ± 0.0033 Nm for roll and
pitch, and ± 0.0005 Nm for the yaw. It is important to remark
that, those bounds are not imposed during the SC mode,
where only the less restrictive constraints are considered,
namely 0.05 Nm [19].
Figure 3 shows shows projections of the ellipsoids EC
(light blue) and E (light green) on the space of the positions
(left) and angles (right). The figure also shows the projections
of the reach set R+(P, TUC) (blue polytope) on the sub-
spaces. From the figure it is possible to observe that all
vertexes are completely contained in the projections of the
invariant ellipsoid EC .
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Fig. 3. Projections of EC(light blue), E (light green) and R+ computed
for  = 0.01 and TUC = 0.37s (blue line) on the position (left), and
angles(right).
Using the values TUC = 0.37 s and  = 0.01 the algorithm
of software rejuvenation has been tested on the nonlinear
model of the quadrotor controlled by the LQR controller
developed using the linearized model of the system. Several
tests have been carried out simulating attacks that provide
arbitrary control inputs. In all the cases the reset clock tr and
safety controller keep the state of the system from hitting the
boundary of EC .
Figure 4 shows the position behaviour of the quadrotor
respect the invariant ellipsoids, and Fig. 5 shows the zoom
of the behaviour respect the several modes of the controller.
Figure 6 shows the time-line for the scheduling of the
software rejuvenation modes in a scenario with two attacks.
In the first case the attacker turns off all the propellers, and
in the second the case the attacker tries to drive the system
to a different equilibrium point.
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Fig. 4. Quadrotor position behaviour respect to EC(light blue) and E (light
green).
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Fig. 5. Zoom of the position behaviour during the several modes: MC
without attack (orange), MC with attack (red), SR (blue), and SC (green).
The results show the effectiveness the adopted solution
using TUC = 0.37 s and  = 0.01 Fig.4. In Fig.6the con-
troller is operating in MC (orange), SR (blue), SC (green),
and MC under attack (red). It is important to note that, in the
case of normal operation during the MC mode, the quadrotor
remains in E after SR, so SC is not activated. If the quadrotor
is out of E after SR, SC is activated and this happens in
particular after the two attacks. Note that the SC activation
does not require the attack detection; the activation strategy
is based only on verifying the state condition xTPx ≤ 1.
VII. DISCUSSION
This paper presents conditions for safety controller de-
sign and timing parameters to support the implementation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
SR
SC
MC
Turn-off Attack
Take-over Attack
Time s
Fig. 6. Time scheduling diagram respect the several conditions, SR
Software Refresh (blue), SC Safety Control (green), MC mission control
(orange), and mission control under attacks: Turn-off Attack and Take-over
Attack (red).
of software rejuvenation to provide CPS security against
cyber attacks on the run-time code and data. The approach
for the case of linear dynamics at an equilibrium state is
developed the general results are illustrated using simulation
of a quadrotor, demonstrating how safety can guaranteed
without having to detect the cyber attacks. The results in
this paper provide the foundation for implementing tracking
control, where a supervisory generates the reference signal
to the mission control algorithm in a manner that provides a
sequence of equilibrium states for safety control. In contrast
to the approach developed in [12], the safety controller
executes only when it is needed, with an upper bound on
the time required to return the system to a safe state, and
the reachability set computations to determine the software
refresh time are performed offline rather than at run time.
There are several directions for future research. The safety
control time bound and the reset time can be improved using
less conservative reachability algorithms. We are currently
extending the results to incorporate state estimation, model-
ing uncertainties and disturbances. We are also developing
experimental implementations and investigating methods for
managing the equilibrium information and control limits on
protected hardware components.
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